Introduction
Poverty reduction and development are now central concerns of global policymakers. 'Pro-poor growth' has become fundamental to globalisation for which 'propoor enabling' policy environments are prescribed. 1 In this context, it has been observed that '[t] he emerging development paradigm breaks with previous international models '. 2 This comes amid the expressed recognition by policymakers that for both globalisation and development:
(. . .)1999 could well have been a turning point, from three angles: implementation of poverty reduction strategies; promoting real and operational partnership, based on shared responsibilities; and a systematic focus on the principles of policy coherence and governance. 3 To be sure, 1999 did signal a shift to an ostensibly different political project for global poverty reduction and development, suggesting a movement away from the The rules and norms of the emerging global development architecture, 12 however, I show to coincide-or rather to become unified-with wider global trends towards policy convergence, 13 in the logic of what Cutler refers to as the 'unification movement '. 14 The norms central to the unification movement are those of 'the law merchant (lex mercatoria) or private international trade law'. 15 Through a critical engagement with the emerging global development architecture, I show the poverty reduction agenda to be strategically embedded in global political economy. I demonstrate how it is instrumental in efforts to consolidate the unification movement and argue that its primary function is to link the unification movement at the supranational level with local social policy and politics. Consequently, the rules and norms of the global unification movement are extended to the level of individuals within local communities. Thus, the emerging development agenda many be conceptualised as an effort to 'globalise' the unification movement not merely at the 'constitutional level', but also at the level of establishing its reach and entrenchment within the realm of actual social relations.
I substantiate this argument by drawing on the example of microcredit and poverty reduction. Microcredit has salient local ramifications, as well as crucial multi-level policy implications. It thus affords crucial insights for locating the poverty reduction agenda in global political economy. 16 The idea that microcredit-as the road to self-reliance 17 -is an effective intervention for the 'empowerment of women' 18 in particular, and poverty reduction more
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12 These may be deduced from an interpretation of prescribed development strategies, which include: an institutional and legal framework which supports the emergence of an enterprise-based economy and an efficient public sector. The development of a competitive environment which enhances the efficient functioning of markets. See OECD, 'Development Co-operation 1999 Report', p. 28. 13 generally, has come to occupy the status of a hegemonic discourse. 19 Locally, microcredit is purported to stimulate a transformation of the 'vicious circle' of poverty into a 'virtuous cycle' of economic advancement. Microcredit has been endorsed and adopted by the World Bank, Regional Development Banks and Bilateral and Multilateral Development Agencies and United Nations (UN) agencies. 20 In February 1997, it was given global coverage through the Microcredit Summit in Washington DC, which inaugurated an action plan to reach 100 million of the worlds poorest families, and particularly the women of those families, with microcredit by the year 2005. 21 The Summit's goals have been endorsed and are supported by actors including the Councils of International Financial Institutions and Donor Agencies. 22 The UN has adopted a resolution to declare the year 2005 as the year of microcredit.
23
Explaining microcredit
Microcredit is the provision of small loans to poor individuals usually within groups as capital investment to enable income-generation through self-employment. Microcredit programmes may be complemented by the extension of microfinancial services (for example, options for insurance schemes or savings). 24 Microcredit differs significantly from other targeted poverty reduction strategies in that it is embedded in a commercial framework. Furthermore, it relies on the provision of credit only. No advancement of skills through training schemes (capabilities enhancement) accompany the packages. The approach has therefore come to be termed as microcredit minimalism. Microcredit is provided in the absence of conventional forms of collateral. Instead, group (mutual) guarantee mechanisms, such as peer monitoring and peer pressure, are employed as a form of social collateral. Interest rates are charged on a commercial basis. In some cases it is a condition that Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) do not lend to the poor below a given commercial rate. 25 Public discourses on microcredit have presented it as a panacea for poverty reduction. Much of its legitimacy has also been sustained through its association 19 with the 'success' stories of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, 26 which has come to serve as a model of the 'virtuous' outcomes of microfinance minimalism. 27 However, impact assessment studies have challenged the conventional wisdom of the poverty impact of microcredit, including the 'success' stories of the Grameen Bank. 28 The World Bank's own studies have cautioned on the 'band-wagoning' 29 of microcredit minimalism for poverty reduction. 30 Such critical findings have not translated into policy rectification, rather policymakers have reacted by changing the terms of reference. Thus, where the widespread use of microcredit for purposes other than investment for self-employment prevails, policymakers now refer to 'consumption smoothing'. The equally widespread practice of poor clients borrowing from one NGO (and/or MFI) to pay off the other is simply referred to as 'crossborrowing' or 'over-lapping'. The taking of new loans to service repayment of old loans is referred to as 'pyramid loan' systems. In this context, the question arises as to what really motivates the microcredit agenda?
Closer scrutiny suggests that microcredit may be motivated primarily by its capacity to perform a 'dual function' in the global political economy. Firstly, as a financially steered targeted poverty reduction strategy, microcredit, via its implications for policy, facilitates financial sector liberalisation as well as extending the policy of trade in financial services to the local level. Secondly, microcredit minimalism has a disciplinary potential that renders it particularly conducive to functioning as a political safety-net. In the latter case, it offsets 'income-insecurity' and attempts to absorb surplus labour in growing informal sectors. 31 Appropriated as a political safetynet, microcredit via its disciplinary potential dampens or contains resistance to the implementation of neoliberal policies at local levels. 32 In addressing microcredit in . 32 See n. 28 above; Microcredit, as a strategy to offset income insecurity (from the perspectives of both the creditors and debtors) can often be tied to the political motives of creditors, with which debtors may choose to comply if framed as the only alternative for meeting basic needs. These social needs may be further instrumentalised to undermine or fragment social and political solidarity at the community level, especially in a context of repayment crisis. Global efforts to advance particularly the financial sector imperatives 34 of the unification movement via effecting policy changes may encounter multi-level political as well as social constraints.
35 This is because:
[t]he global unification movement privileges the private sphere and facilitates the further denationalization of capital and the disembedding of commercial activities from governmental and social control. Unification thus operates as a corporate strategy designed to assist the reconfiguration of authority in the global political economy in line with the disciplinary neoliberal agenda.
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The implications of the unification movement are social as well as political: They can be seen to 'blur the distinction between public and private authority in global political economy'. 37 This 'obscures the political significance of private economic power through the association of authority with the public sphere and its disassociation with private activities'. 38 Private economic power as public authority not only undermines the 'democratic provision' 39 but also limits the parameters of how entitlements to public goods and services might be secured. 40 This shift in the nature and form of governance is 'reconfiguring political authority as significant decisions over the disposition of resources are being devolved to the private sphere', 41 and thus making it harder to sustain a 'public' challenge to private authority.
The social tension inherent in artificially abstracting the economic from the political through a 'public/private' distinction, 42 which is a 'differentiation within the 33 The case of Bangladesh is an illustrative example of how the dual purpose of microcredit functions. In 1996 the World Bank authorised a poverty alleviation microfinance project for Bangladesh. This project is also recognised as part of an overall strategy for financial sector liberalisation. political sphere', 43 may well need to be managed through disciplinary neoliberalism. 44 Thus, if the advancement of the unification movement proceeds through neoliberal discipline at the global level, then its extension to the level of individuals within local communities may also reflect this dynamic. In this context, the 'dual function' of microcredit becomes relevant: its capacity to facilitate the advance of the unification movement while at the same time offsetting its socially disembedding logic via its function as a political safety-net. Its disciplinary component may be crucial to the objective of extending the socially disembedding logic of the global unification movement to the level of local communities.
The global framing of the poverty reduction agenda in these terms under the postWashington Consensus suggests an approach to development based on a strategy of crisis management. The objective seems to be to manage what is perceived as 'two crises': the crisis of global poverty 45 and the crisis of global capitalism. 46 Through insights drawn from Karl Polanyi it will be shown below how such a conceptualisation may misinform global responses to poverty reduction.
Polanyi's double-movement: understanding the 'two crises'
The two crises-the crisis of global poverty and a crisis of capitalism-are salient features of contemporary global political order: they are at the centre of such globalisation debates, 47 as James Mittelman captures in terms of the 'globalisation syndrome'. 48 Globalisation as a process may be conceived in terms of both the expansion (and consolidation) of the unification movement 49 as well as in terms of increasing trends to conceive of a humanist global project based on universal rights and duties, anchored in notions of substantive democratic participation. 50 This means that expectations of empowerment for the 'better life' are increased simultaneously as the unification movement is advanced. But the tendency of the unification movement to operate in a socially disembedding logic may undermine the emanicipatory project and thus result in the delegitimation of the unification movement itself. This tension was brought to the fore, challenging the Washington Consensus. It is in such a context that questions pertaining to the legitimacy of globalisation increasingly came to global prominence.
51
The two crises are neither new, nor independent of each other. In The Great Transformation, Polanyi captured what is at stake in this context in dialectical terms, and conceptualised it through the metaphor of the 'double movement'. 52 He referred to the specificity of capitalism on the one hand to disembed the economy from society, allowing the free market to self-regulate with reference to public goods. 53 However, Polanyi observed that this ideal was a 'stark utopia' 54 that set in motion a dialectical process comprising society's attempts to recapture and re-embed the economy within social and political control. 55 The dialectic of the 'double movement' was thus discerned to be the tension between 'market society' and 'society with markets'. The former refers to the 'propensity of capitalist society to define and to quantify social life in market terms', 56 the latter to socially embedded forms of exchange predicated on reciprocity and redistribution.
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Although Polanyi's insights are historically specific, it has been argued that the analogy of the 'double movement' may be equally applicable to present circumstances. 58 However, rather than an analogy it is better understood as a historical continuum of the tension inherent in the 'push' factor of market forces and the 'pull' factor of the social life-world. In the contemporary context, what might have changed to a degree however-since the post-1945 political order-is the role of the state as a counterforce to protect society from the potentially adverse consequences of the tendency of capital to become disembedded. 59 Thus, for example, the Thus, in the latest phase, the tension of the 'double-movement' can be captured between the agencies of a transnational elite class 63 (advancing Polanyi's first movement, the market) and what might be loosely defined as 'global social movements' 64 (counter-advancing Polanyi's second movement). 65 In this sense, it may be argued that contemporary global transformation has merely transposed the dynamic of the 'double movement' from the confines of the Westphalian unit to the level of global social relations. 66 Thus, 'solutions to the problems of security and welfare' must now be 'found in transnational structures, global or regional'. 67 It is in the context of these trends and transformations that local social policy (particularly of low income states) has increasingly come to be set and defined at the level of global institutions. Deacon recently referred to this dynamic as the supranationalisation of local social policy. 68 Thus, in addition to providing an understanding of the tensions between 'capital and society' under capitalism, what Polanyi's insights provide is a backdrop for locating and understanding the historical continuity of the poverty reduction agenda of the post-Washington Consensus. In this sense, the specific example of microcredit and poverty reduction can be best understood if situated in an historical process of crisis management. For this a brief engagement with the crisis of the 1970s and the evolution of the Washington Consensus is instructive. The genesis of the Washington Consensus can be seen to have its roots in the capacity crisis of the 1970s. It has been argued that this crisis began 'with the erosion of the basis of postwar prosperity in the late 1960s (before the first oil shock of 1973), leading to a collapse of opportunities for productive investment'. 70 In seeking opportunities for capital accumulation, the pursuit of the potential for trade in services, and specifically financial services, emerged as a crucial objective of the advanced capitalist states. 71 These states were now post-industrial societies, with a thriving services sector. 72 As Ruggie observed then, 'the blurring of boundaries between domestic and international realms' were 'both hastened and deepened by the growing significance of traded services'. 73 
Capacity crisis, trade in services and trade in finance
In the context of efforts to advance the services sector, finance, as an investment category in itself, was to be included in the 'trade in services' agenda by the advanced capitalist states. 74 The 'decision in 1973 to abandon fixed exchange rates for good' 75 set in motion the 'formal' transition from a restrictive financial order to a liberal financial order. 76 One consequence has been the dynamic expansion of the financial services sector that saw the rise of non-bank institutions engaging with banking services and banks engaging with innovative financial investments. 77 With reference to the implications of these shifts in political economy, Robert Cox noted their implications for the options and choices of national policymaking. He stated then, that '[a]djustment to global competitiveness is the new categorical imperative'. 78 Generally, representatives of 'developing' states have been reluctant to 'adjust' to the new global imperatives, and have been particularly cautious of liberalising their financial sectors. However, primarily, although not only, through the instrumental role of particularly the IMF and World Bank, adjustments of state policy to the new global imperatives have been facilitated.
For example, Samir Amin locates the 'actions of international institutions after 1970' in this context. 79 He refers to the roles of the IMF and the World Bank in managing the crisis of this period and specifically to the development and promotion of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) by and through these institutions. 80 If it can be argued that SAPs, to a degree, represent policy initiatives to advance Polanyi's first movement in response to the crisis of the 1970s, the counter-response by the second movement was to follow.
SAPS, the Washington Consensus and Polanyi's second movement
The implementation of SAPs increased rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s. As their impact became more far-reaching a 'politics of disquiet' took shape at multilevels and particularly at the local level. 81 At this juncture, initial discernable indications arose of the imminence of pushes in terms of Polanyi's 'second movement'. One of the most evident manifestations of the potential of the 'second movement' to resist the advance of the socially disembedding logic of the 'first movement' occurred in Bolivia during the implementation of the New Economic Program (NEP) in 1986. 82 To offset the demands of the 'second movement', the Emergency Social Fund (ESF) for Bolivia was created. Microcredit minimalism was a key component of the ESF. 83 The ESF approach departed from traditional public welfare programmes. It was both Global development architecture and microcredit 547 conceptually and in its practical design oriented towards the private entrepreneurwhich suited well the objectives of the NEP.
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The Bolivian ESF: the counter-response to the second movement?
The Bolivian ESF was, from its inception, informed primarily by strategic political considerations. 85 The 'dual function' of microcredit minimalism served well to sustain as well as facilitate the liberalisation agenda from the 'bottom-up'. Analysis of the ESF for its potential for replication concluded that:
[t]he basic principle of a financial intermediary that provides grants to local groups on a demand-driven basis using flexible and well designed management strategies is more globally applicable. 86 The ESF approach has been replicated through the World Bank's Social Funds policy framework in comparable political situations elsewhere. 87 The strategic role of Social Funds (and safety-nets more generally) in disciplining the poor has been well researched. 88 There is evidence to support a causal linkage between the strategy itself, as well as its methods of implementation, and pre-empted political outcomes, at least in the formal sense. The ESF strategy was to become a crucial element in the poverty reduction policy inventory of the post-Washington Consensus, particularly since it has been acknowledged that the social costs of adjustment may not be a temporary problem of transition but rather long-term.
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The 'double movement' and complex multilateralism: towards the Post-Washington Consensus
The Bolivian experience reflected the potential implications of political contestations for the implementation of SAPs: from a Polanyian interpretation, the politics of the second movement was increasingly gaining prominence. In 1986, the IMF recognised the urgent need to proactively counteract such tendencies. 90 These concerns were incorporated into policy in the form of 'confidential standard instructions' from 1988 onwards, 91 which stipulated that the IMF 'in concert with the member country, may seek a solution within the framework of the programme' 92 to counteract any potential social and political resistance. It is in this context, that a distinctively reformulated poverty focus also re-emerged in the World Bank. 93 The focus being on '. . . the poorest groups in countries that are undertaking adjustment programs'. 94 The World Bank developed a 'Master Plan' which included '. . . involvement with NGOs, poverty programs, women's programs, and micro-enterprises,' 95 These efforts resulted in the adoption of the Program of Targeted Interventions (PTI) for poverty reduction. 96 In 1991 an Operational Directive on poverty (OD 4.15) was approved. As targeted approaches to poverty reduction increased so did the appropriation of microcredit. 97 By 1995, '(a)bout 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries' had adopted 'some version of the ESF model'. 98 It may have seemed that the World Bank was finally responding to calls for 'adjustment with a human face'. However, the increase of targeted interventions that accompany investment lending must be understood in context.
Poverty reduction and financial sector liberalisation: legitimating coercive convergence?
99
Given that financial sector steering through poverty reduction had already been institutionalised from the 'bottom-up', 100 the stage had already been set to smooth the process of policy convergence in the logic of the unification movement between and within institutions. For example, trends in the global financial services sector In recasting its operational policy for the financial sector, the World Bank has explicitly incorporated microcredit minimalism into it. Moreover, it is anticipated that the World Bank's forthcoming Operational Policy 4.15 (OP 4.15) on Poverty will cite microcredit as a targeted poverty reduction strategy. 107 In this sense, OP 4.15 will complement-and facilitate-the implementation of wider financial sector objectives.
Although not yet formally co-ordinated, through the PTI and Social Funds lending modalities this has effectively been achieved in practice. Importantly, by anchoring OP 8.30 (FIL) in the context of the microcredit and poverty reduction agenda, the advance of broader financial sector policy objectives is legitimated via the poverty reduction discourse.
The World Bank's role in facilitating the 'enabling environment' for the financial services sector via the microcredit and poverty reduction agenda is further exemplified by the creation of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) in 1995. The CGAP, a multi-donor initiative, is specifically charged with a mandate to facilitate the enabling environment for microcredit minimalism. 108 The CGAP has co-ordinated operations with the World Bank to achieve country-level (and regional) commitments for financial liberalisation. According to the CGAP, this has resulted in 'expedited financial sector reform' in several countries, including China, Brazil, Vietnam and Togo. 109 The implications for financial sector liberalisation at multiple levels, as a result of policy co-ordination for poverty reduction through microfinance, are evident. The 'level of global integration in financial services has proceeded far further than in most other sectors of economic life'. 110 Significant progress has been made on the liberalisation of the financial sectors of developing countries. 111 The contribution of microcredit conducive policy adjustments towards this outcome must not be underestimated.
It is against the background of the argument developed so far that I draw observations about the relationship between the Washington Consensus, the postWashington Consensus and the emerging global development architecture. These are addressed below.
The post-Washington Consensus and the imposition of a global development architecture (GDA)
Under the post-Washington Consensus, the global unification of private international trade law is consolidated in terms of an architecture for global development at the supranational level. 112 This entails the harmonisation of policy across a broad range of global institutions (such as the World Bank, UN Agencies as the UNDAF 113 and multilateral and bilateral development agencies). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has been commissioned to oversee this process. 114 Key instruments for its implementation are the new poverty-focused conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). 115 The framing of the emerging GDA in terms of the global unification movement means that its central function is best understood against the backdrop of the 'double movement'. It is designed to primarily reassert the supremacy of Polanyi's 'first movement'. This can be discerned clearly in relation to central premises of the emerging GDA. Policy prescriptions emphasise economic liberalisation and the freemarket approach as a prerequisite for other emancipatory goals. 116 Thus, the DAC is explicit that the social and environmental agenda 'must be associated with liberalization'. 117 The emerging GDA exhibits a close affinity with the rules and norms of world trade law; 118 indeed through the emerging GDA the development and world trade agendas are conjoined. Here, the rules and norms of emerging GDA becomes unified with the global unification movement, and then implemented through a harmonisation of policy across global institutions. Hence, the argument that attention must be paid, 'concretely and systematically to policy coherence. (. . .) Here, coherence means coherence between policies in the North and South alike, and of all within the multilateral organisation. 119 Thus, new forms of policy interlinkages emerge. 120 Policy co-ordination at this level and in its current phase can be seen to relate not only, but particularly, to sectors (such as finance, health, education), which coincides with current imperatives to advance the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the WTO. 121 With reference to the financial services sector, financial liberalisation commitments in terms of the GATS now provide the World Bank and the IMF with both criteria according to which they draw up conditionalities for SAPs, and legal leverage for their implementation. 122 'Indeed, South Korea undertook to improve its GATS financial services commitments as part of its 1998 IMF programme.' 123 The example of microcredit is again particularly illustrative in this context.
Microcredit minimalism has been given explicit recognition as global best practice. The guidelines for minimalism as outlined in the 'pink-book' 124 reflect the degree to which it is prestructured for all levels of the extension process of the global financial system. Firstly, the guidelines are harmonised with the World Bank's position on financial sector operations. Secondly, NGOs as potential financial intermediaries to the poor are subject to status revision by the CGAP and donor community for best practice. In many cases NGOs are now changing their status legally from 'NGO' to 'financial intermediary'. Thirdly, the language used in the policy literature on microcredit is of creating the enabling environment to ensure access to credit for the poor, reflecting directly the legal language of the GATS of the WTO. 125 Crucial here is not the replication of language per se but rather the policy implications of the legal interpretations for broader financial sector objectives. Implementation of the GATS is controversial. The GATS is tantamount to direct investment policy and not trade as conventionally understood. The microcredit minimalism and poverty reduction agenda can be seen to make a significant contribution to the removal of barriers to capital mobility in terms of both direct policy implications as well as legitimating it in terms of increasing access to credit for the poor; creating 'pro-poor enabling policy environments'. The argument advanced here is discernible in the British Government's latest White Paper on International Development, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor. 126 By changing the terms of reference so as to render opaque the actual social experiences implied by such policies, any direct engagement with their cause and consequences in political terms might be avoided.
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Poverty reduction as crisis management: a Polanyian after-thought
Through the example of microcredit, the article has traced the dynamic of the poverty reduction agenda of the post-Washington Consensus back to the crisis of the 1970s. Microcredit has been situated in a historical context of crisis management of the advanced capitalist states. Even from a narrowly conceived South-North political economy perspective, it is clear that the crisis management strategy adopted then has not solved the crisis of capacity of the advanced capitalist states. Rather, we have rising concerns globally, including in the US, with growing surplus labour operating in the informal sectors.
128 Thus, the implications of the poverty reduction agenda must be understood in the historical context of global political economy.
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It is worthwhile to refer back to the initial framing of the poverty reduction agenda in Polanyian terms. If the market was seen to move 'into a groove' once again in the 1970s, efforts to reassert its supremacy came up against social and political limits, especially at the national level of policymaking, during the 1980s. A counter-response was shaped and was largely implemented by relevant global institutions through disciplinary neoliberalism. 130 This merely extended the dynamic of the 'second movement' to the level of the 'local' or the 'life-world', prompting a further counter-response focused on problems of micro-level risk management and Global development architecture and microcredit 553 thus setting the target for disciplining directly at the community level. Microcredit has been particularly conducive to both advancing the logic of the unification movement and offsetting its socially disembedding logic through its own inbuilt disciplinary potential imposed in the social sphere. Since the argument advanced here adopts a historical approach and is particularly shown to link to the crisis of the 1970s, something needs to be said about the post-1945 embedded liberal compromise. Although embedded liberalism 'did indeed constitute a restructuring of the relationship between markets and political authority as Ruggie suggests' it never 'challenged the ultimate basis of the market as a disembodied institution itself '. 131 As Lacher argues, 'embedded liberalism' as conceptualised by Ruggie, did not work precisely because it differed fundamentally from the 're-embedding' of the economy in society in Polanyi's sense. Re-embedding cannot mean simply the restriction of the free-market, 'but its complete subjugation to democratic control by society, including the extension of democracy to the economic sphere'. 132 An analysis of the post-Washington Consensus poverty reduction agenda using Polanyian insights helps not only to situate these recent trends within the broader context of capitalist crisis management but also to understand what these insights might offer for an emancipatory politics of development. A starting point is the recognition that the crisis of global poverty and the crisis of global capitalism are not distinct from each other, but are constituted as 'one', and must be understood in dialectical terms. A reconceptualisation of the crisis in these terms, may explain why even the best of intentions have either failed or resulted in further immiseration. Understanding this means understanding that '[p]overty is not a contingent social relation under capitalism; it is a necessary relation'. 133 The non-recognition of the 'crisis' in these terms will mean that strategies in response will be based on the 'rejection or non-recognition of limits' 134 to crisis management. In this sense, the post-Washington Consensus-neoliberal politics-is perhaps 'the most evident manifestation of globalization', and can be seen 'not as the resolution of capitalist crisis but as "the politics of the unresolved crisis" '. 135 The political implications of development as crisis management may well be regressive, particularly if viewed from the perspective of substantive democratic politics. Under the post-Washington Consensus crisis management continues to push against its own limits. 136 The social implications of this mean that the imperatives of the
